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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Section 78-14-4M)• 
No malpractice actioi i against a health care provider may 
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injuryf whichever first occurs, but not to exceed 
the four years after the date of the alleged act, 
omissior neglect . occurrence '"^.ohasis added. 
Por • ' • >m i t * ^a } < 
No malpractice action against, a health care provider may 
be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the 
prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days prior notice of intent to commence an 
action. Such notice shall include a general statement 
of the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the 
date, time and place =-f \ se occurrence, the 
circumstances thereof, ^o^i-ific allegations of 
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the 
nature of '.he alleged injuries and other damages 
sustained. Motice may be -^  '\ette- ;r affidavit form 
executed L^ *-.'. *Mf:f ",\ ^ o~- a:r-o-no**- Service 
shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the 
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
for the service of the summons and complaint in a civil 
action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served 
within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice 
action against a health care provider. If the notice is 
served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of 
the applicable time period, the time for commencing the 
malpractice action against the health care provider 
shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service 
of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its 
retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the 
limitation on the time for commencing any action, and 
shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after 
April 1, 1976. This section shall not apply to third 
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a 
health care provider. [Emphasis added]. 
Section 78-14-12: 
(1) The Department of Business Regulations shall 
provide a hearing panel in alleged medical malpractice 
cases against health care providers as defined in 
Section 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985. The 
department shall establish procedures for prelitigation 
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death 
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or 
alleged failure to provide health care. The proceedings 
are informal and nonbinding, but are compulsory as a 
condition precedent to commencing litigation. 
Proceedings conducted under authority of this section 
are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil 
process. 
(2) The party initiating the medical malpractice action 
shall file a request for prelitigation panel review with 
the Department of Business Regulations within 60 days 
after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to 
commence action under Section 78-14-8. The request 
shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence 
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care 
providers named in the notice and request. 
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(3) The filing of a request for prel i tig at ion panel 
review under this Section tolls the applicable statute 
of limitations until 60 days following the issuance of 
an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion 
shall be sent to all parties by certified mail, return 
receipt requested. [Emphasis added]. 
Sect i< : . 1 : 
No recocd of the proceedings is required . --' 1 
evidence documents, and exhibits are returned zo ir.e 
parties or witnesses who provided the evidence, 
documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings. 
The hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas 
and to administer oaths, and any expenses incurred by 
the panel in this regard are paid by the requesting 
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and 
mileage. The proceedings are informal and formal rules 
of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery 
or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except 
upon special order of the panel, and for good cause 
shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstvices. 
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally -r with 
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon 
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of 
the parties. The proceedings are confidential and 
closed to the public. No party shall have the ''13-;= to 
cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary 
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be 
followed. The panel may, however, request special or 
supplemental participation of some or all parties in 
particular respects. Communications between the panel 
and the parties, except the testimony of the parties on 
the merits of the dispute, are disclosed t^  31 "• -^ .r.er 
parties, 
(3) The Department of Business Regulations shall 
appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the matter 
for panel review as soon as practicable after receipt of 
a request. 
(4) Parties may be represents
 i e^^ol in 
proceedings before a panel. [Emphasis added] .. -
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7. No person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case: Plaintiff appeals the Order of 
Judge Michael R. Murphy dated November 10, 1988 which dismissed 
his claim against all defendants on the grounds plaintiff had 
failed to timely file his Complaint under the provisions of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The Court found that 
plaintiff, by filing his complaint prior to a Prelitigation 
review of the case, violated the express provisions of U.C.A. § 
73-14-12 which requires a Prelitigation review of medical 
malpractice cases as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition: 
1. On or about January 31, 1986, plaintiff filed 
his Notice of intent to commence a malpractice action against the 
defendants named herein. Plaintiff claimed damages from alleged 
improper medical treatment he received pursuant to a skiing 
accident which took place on February 1, 1984. 
2. Plaintiff filed a Request for a Prelitigation 
review of the case on or about March 4, 1986. Before a hearing 
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could be scheduled, p l a i n t i f f f i l ed a Complaint against the 
defendants al leging medical malpract ice . 
3 . On December 2, 1986, a P r e l i t i g a t i o n hearing 
was held pursuant to p l a i n t i f f ' s Request and the Panel rendered 
i t s opinion on the same da te . The Panel found p l a i n t i f f ' s claim 
had no mer i t . 
4. On or about November 4, 1987, defendants Holy 
Cross Family Health & Emergency Center, Holy Cross Hospital , Park 
City Ambulance and Dr. Winn, f i l ed Motions to dismiss p l a i n t i f f ' s 
Complaint based on p l a i n t i f f ' s i n i t i a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n before 
the P r e l i t i g a t i o n hearing had been held. Judge Brian heard the 
Motion on March 7, 1988, and ruled p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d to a 
second P r e l i t i g a t i o n hearing and the s t a t u t e of l imi t a t ions would 
not be t o l l ed un t i l a ful l review had been taken. Judge Brian 
a lso continued defendants ' Motions to dismiss without da te . 
5. On or about July 6, 1988, a second 
P r e l i t i g a t i o n hearing was held and an opinion was rendered on 
July 12, 1988. The P r e l i t i g a t i o n Panel again found p l a i n t i f f ' s 
claim was without meri t . 
6. During the l a t e r part of September, 1988, a l l 
defendants f i l ed Motions to dismiss p l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint on the 
grounds the Complaint had been prematurely f i l ed . The Motion was 
set for hearing on October 3, 1988 and was continued un t i l 
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October 17, 1988 at plaintiff's request. The Motion was heard by 
Judge Michael R. Murphy on October 17, 1988, and Judge Murphy 
dismissed plaintiff's Complaint because it was not filed in 
accordance with the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
7. Plaintiff filed the instant appeal on December 
12, 1988. 
C. Statement of Facts; 
1. On or about February 1, 1984, plaintiff was 
involved in a skiing accident and received medical care from the 
defendants. (Record, page 1-12). 
2. Plaintiff filed a Notice of intent to commence 
malpractice action on January 31, 1986. (Exhibit "A"). 
3. Defendant Howe requested a Prelitigation 
review of his claim on March 4, 1986. This request was made 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-14-12. (Exhibit "B" ) . 
4. Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging medical 
malpractice against the defendants on May 23, 1986. (Record, 
page 1-12). 
5. Defendant Howe filed an Answer to plaintiff's 
Complaint on June 20, 1986. (Record, page 28). 
6. On or about July 3, 1986, the parties 
stipulated the time for holding a Prelitigation hearing on 
plaintiff's claim, as required by U.C.A. § 78-14-13(3), be 
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extended for successive thirty (30) day periods until a hearing 
could be scheduled by the Division of Occupational & Professional 
Licensing. (Record, page 32). 
7. Pursuant to plaintifffs request for a 
Prelitigation Panel review of his claim, the Division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing scheduled a hearing for 
December 2, 1986. The Panel rendered its opinion on the same day 
and found plaintiff's claim was not meritorious. (Exhibit "C"). 
8. During the first part of April, 1986, 
defendants, Holy Cross Family & Emergency Center, Holy Cross 
Hospital, Park City Ambulance and Dr. Winn, filed Motions to 
dismiss plaintiff's claim. The Motions were grounded on the fact 
that plaintiff had filed his Complaint prior to a Prelitigation 
Panel review of his case in violation of U.C.A. § 78-14-12. 
(Record, page 39). 
9. Defendants' Motions to dismiss were argued 
before Judge Brian on March 7, 1988. The Judge continued 
defendants' Motions without date and allowed plaintiff to request 
a second Prelitigation Panel review. The defendants' Motions 
were reserved. (Record, page 84). 
10. A second Prelitigation Panel review was 
scheduled for hearing on July 6, 1988. The Panel issued its 
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opinion on July 12th and found plaintiff's Complaint to be non-
meritorious. (Exhibit "D"). 
11. On August 25, 1988, plaintiff's attorney 
withdrew as counsel. (Record, page 87). 
12. On August 29, 31 and again on September 23, 
1988, plaintiff was notified to appear in person or appoint 
counsel. (Record, pages 89, 94, and 96). 
13. In late September of 1988, all defendants 
filed Motions to dismiss on the grounds plaintiff's Complaint had 
been prematurely filed in violation of U.C.A. § 78-14-12. A 
hearing on the Motions was scheduled for October 3, 1988. 
(Record, page 99-124). 
14. On October 3, 1988, the parties appeared in 
Coalville on defendants' Motions to dismiss. The plaintiff 
appeared pro se and asked the Court for a continuance so that he 
could obtain an attorney. The Court continued the hearing until 
October 17, 1988. (Record, page 128, Transcript, page 9). 
15. On October 17th, the parties gathered in 
Coalville to argue defendants' Motions to dismiss. The 
defendant, again, appeared without counsel and asked for 
additional time in order to hire an attorney. The Court ruled 
that the plaintiff had had ample time within which to hire an 
attorney and proceeded to hear the defendants' Motions. The 
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Court granted defendants' Motions to dismiss on the grounds the 
plaintiff had improperly filed his complaint. (Record, page 132; 
Transcript, page 14-16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act requires, as a 
mandatory condition precedent to filing a malpractice suit, that 
a plaintiff first obtain a Prelitigation Panel review of his 
claim. A Complaint filed prior to the Prelitigation review 
process is subject to dismissal. Since plaintiff filed his 
Complaint prior to the Prelitigation review process and hearing, 
the lower Court properly dismissed his case. 
The issues of estoppel, waiver, res judicata, collateral 
estoppel and the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act are raised for the first time in this appeal and, 
therefore, are not proper subjects for review. Even if this 
Court considers such issues, the Trial Court's ruling should be 
affirmed because of the following: 
1. Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional 
grounds can be brought at any time and is not waived by a failure 
to plead the same. 
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2. Defendants' Motions to dismiss are not barred 
by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because 
a hearing on the Motions was expressly reserved by Judge Brian. 
3. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is not 
unconstitutionally vague. Rather, plaintiff has unreasonably 
interpreted its provisions and has not overcome the presumption 
of validity accorded to statutory enactments. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFfS 
COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
U.C.A. §78-14-12. 
The provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
U.C.A. § 73-14-1, et seg., were designed to "provide a reasonable 
time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers....and provide other procedural changes to expedite 
[the] early evaluation and settlement of claims". U.C.A. § 78-
14-2. As a part of the Act, the legislature established certain 
conditions precedent to the filing of malpractice lawsuits. 
Under the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-14-4, a plaintiff is required 
to give the prospective defendant ninety (90) days1 prior notice 
of his intent to file an action. Failure to provide such notice 
is grounds for dismissal. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 
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(Utah 1979). In addition, U.C.A. § 78-14-12 requires the 
plaintiff to request a Prelitigation Panel to review his claim 
prior to filing a lawsuit. The Prelitigation hearing process is 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation". 
(Emphasis added) U.C.A. § 78-14-12(1). 
In order to provide a plaintiff sufficient time to 
comply with the mandatory prerequisites as set forth above, the 
legislature has enacted provisions which toll the statute of 
limitations. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-14-8, the statute of 
limitations is tolled for 120 days if the notice of intent to sue 
is served within ninety (90) days of the expiration of the 
statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is also 
tolled while the plaintiff's claim is heard by the Prelitigation 
Panel and for a period of sixty (60) days thereafter. U.C.A. § 
78-14-12. The tolling provisions are clear in their meaning, and 
allow a plaintiff ample time to complete the mandatory conditions 
precedent and still file a timely claim. 
In the instant case, plaintiff was entitled to file a 
complaint during the sixty (60) day period following the issuance 
of the Prelitigation Panel's opinion. However, plaintiff ignored 
the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-14-12 and filed his Complaint prior 
to the completion of the Prelitigation review process. His 
reasons for doing so are hard to understand, in light of the 
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clear and unambiguous provisions of U.C.A. § 78-14-12 which toll 
the statute of limitations until sixty (60) days following the 
issuance of the Prelitigation Panel's opinion. Furthermore, 
plaintiff was fully aware of the tolling provisions of the Act as 
is evidenced by his statement at page 18 of his brief which reads 
"it appears, therefore, that the plaintiff would not be required 
to file a complaint until sixty (60) days after the opinion of 
the review Panel". A similar statement is made in plaintiff's 
Memorandum in opposition to defendants' first Motion to dismiss 
(Exhibit "A", Page 3), 
Plaintiff's interpretation of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act ignores the plain meaning of the statute and 
fails to consider the statute as a whole. As this Court stated: 
...[S]tatutory enactments are to be 
so construed so as to render all 
parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful, and that interpretations 
are to be avoided which render some 
part of the provision nonsensical or 
absurd... Millett v. Clark Clinic 
Corporation, 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 
1980) . 
Plaintiff has had ample time to file a Complaint in 
compliance with the Act and has been aware of defendants' 
objections to his early filing since defendants filed their 
first Motion to dismiss in November of 1987. Plaintiff/ 
however, chose to ignore the statutory requirements and 
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prematurely filed his Complaint. Because of his failure to 
comply with the clear and straightforward provisions of the 
Act, plaintiff1s Complaint was properly dismissed. 
B. THE ISSUES OF WAIVER, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MAL-
PRACTICE ACT ARE NOT PROPER QUESTIONS FOR 
REVIEW. 
In Utah, matters not presented to the Trial Court 
by way of pleadings or otherwise cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah 1987). "This general rule applies equally to 
constitutional issues... ." Pratt v. City Council of City 
of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-4 (Utah 1981). Yates v. 
Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980). 
In his appeal, plaintiff raises several issues 
which were never considered by the District Court. 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff's "Statement of Issues" 
concern questions of estoppel, waiver, res judicata, 
collateral estoppel and the constitutionality of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. These issues were never argued 
to the District Court nor can they be found in the record. 
Because the above issues are not properly before the Court, 
they should not be considered in this appeal. 
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Even if this Court finds the issues raised by 
plaintiff are proper questions for review, the lower Court's 
dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint should be upheld for the 
following reasons: 
1. The defendant Howe did not waive his right to 
move for dismissal* 
Plaintiff claims defendant Howe, by filing an 
Answer to plaintiff's Complaint, waived any objection to its 
untimely filing. Such a contention cannot be sustained. 
Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(2)....whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, 
the court shall dismiss the 
action. .•• 
A Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) can be 
made at any time before or during trial. Smith v. Vuicich, 
699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985). Because plaintiff failed to 
comply with the jurisdictional provisions of U.C.A. § 78-14-
12, Howe's Motion to dismiss was entirely proper. 
2. The defendants' second Motion to dismiss is 
not barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
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The doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel are based on the premise that a matter fully heard 
and decided should not be relitigated. Bernard v. Attaburyf 
629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Penrod v. New Creations Cream, 669 
P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). Plaintiff argues that the Order 
dismissing his Complaint violates the above rules because 
defendants had filed a prior Motion to dismiss on the same 
grounds. Again, plaintiff's contention cannot stand. The 
simple answer to plaintiff's argument lies in Judge Brian's 
ruling on the first Motion. Judge Brian stated: 
"Defendant, Holy Cross Hospital's 
motion to dismiss is continued 
without date pending pre-litigation 
panel review before medical 
malpractice actions are to be 
filed. Above motion can be 
entertained at that time if counsel 
so chooses". (Exhibit "B"). 
It is clear the Court never did conduct a full 
hearing on the Motion; but, rather continued the matter 
without date. Under the circumstances, res judicata and 
collateral estoppel are inapplicable. 
3. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is 
constitutional. 
Although the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act has 
withstood various constitutional challenges, the Utah 
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Supreme Court has not yet tested the Act for vagueness. 
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 
1980) (Equal Protection). McGuire v. University of Utah 
Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979) (Special 
Legislation); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 63 5 
P.2d 30 (Utah 1981) (Special Legislation). 
In order for a statute to be found 
unconstitutionally vague, it must be so vague that persons 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application. Eves v. Board of Clark 
County Commissioners, 620 P.2d 1248 (Nev. 1980). 
Legislative enactments, however, are accorded a presumption 
of validity. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987). 
In the instant case, plaintiff has not established 
evidence that the provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act are impermissibly vague. Rather, plaintiff 
has unreasonably interpreted the statute and has taken its 
provisions out of context. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff has unreasonably interpreted the 
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and, in 
doing so, has failed to comply with the conditions precedent 
for filing a malpractice suit. Because of the compulsory 
nature of such conditions, plaintiff's Complaint was 
properly dismissed and the Order of the District Court 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this g* ' day of July, 1989. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
JAMES B. HANKS 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent, David Howe, M.D. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
GEORGE M. HALEY 
HALEY St STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 531-1555 
DAVID R. HAMILTON 
MICHAEL G. BELNAP 
FARR, KAUFMAN St HAMILTON 
205 - 26th Street, 034 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 394-5526 
Attorneys for Rolando Avila 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
vs. 
ROBERT T. WYNN, M.D.; 
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH 
AND EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY 
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY 
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
COMMENCE MALPRACTICE ACTION 
Rolando Avila, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley, 
of Haley St Stolebarger, and David R. Hamilton and Michael 
G. Belnap, of Farr, Kaufman Se Hamilton, hereby serve notice to 
Robert T. Wynn, M.D., Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency 
Center (hereinafter "Holy Cross Clinic"), Holy Cross Hospital 
Park City Ambulance (hereinafter "Holy Cross Ambulance"), Holy 
Cross Hospital and David Howe, M.D., of Mr. Avila's intention to 
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commence a medical malpractice action. 
I. NATURE OF CLAIM 
Mr. Avila's claim of malpractice arises out of the medical 
treatment Mr. Avila received after he dislocated his right lower 
extremity in a skiing accident. Mr. Avila fell while skiing and 
hit a lift terminal, which caused the dislocation of his right 
knee. This occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 1, 
1984, where the Rattler and Wizard ski runs intersect. At the 
location of the injury, he was examined by Dr. Roger Suchyta and 
Dr. Ed Bronski, as well as ski patrolman Janet Stoltz. At the 
time of that examination, Mr. Avila had a palpable dorsalis pedis 
pulse and posterior tibial pulse, and his foot was warm. Based 
upon the examination of the above-referenced individuals, the 
extremity was immobilized by the placing of a splint; and 
Mr. Avila was given 50 milligrams of Meperidine. Based upon the 
findings of the above-referenced individuals, a decision was made 
not to use the helicopter to transport Mr. Avila directly to Holy 
Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City; rather, he was taken by 
toboggan to the bottom of the mountain and placed in the care of 
Holy Cross Hospital by and through their agents, Holy Cross 
Ambulance; the driver, EMT Dyer; and the EMT technician, 
Shoshnik. While the ambulance was still at Deer Valley, the 
splint and ski boot were removed, and a capillary fill test was 
performed. At that point, the capillary fill time of Mr. Avila's 
right big toe was within acceptable limits. 
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Upon information and belief, Mr. Avila alleges that it 
is the policy of Holy Cross Ambulance to transport all 
Individuals picked up at Deer Valley or Park City ski resorts 
directly to the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City. Pursuant to that 
policy and practice of the Holy Cross Ambulan.ce, Mr. Avila was 
transported to the Holy Cross Clinic, When Mr. Avila arrived, he 
was examined by Dr. Wynn, who is a pediatrician who does not have 
the requisite training and experience to handle complicated 
orthopedic problems such as he was faced with in the present 
circumstances. Dr. Wynn did not refer the case to one of the 
available orthopedic surgeons in Park City, nor did Dr. Wynn 
immediately transfer Mr. Avila to a health care facility that had 
the appropriate medical staff to deal with the condition that 
Mr. Avila was in. Dr. Wynn attempted to put the knee Mback into 
place" by rotating the lower extremity in a circular motion. 
During this episode, the right popliteal artery was avulsed. 
Dr. Wynn was unsuccessful in his attempt to put the leg back into 
place, and then ordered Mr. Avila transferred to Holy Cross 
Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
The foregoing episode took place on February 1, 1984, at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. 
Mr. Avila arrived at Holy Cross Hospital in the late 
afternoon of February 1, 1984. Upon arrival, his lower extremity 
was examined by Dr. David Howe, who could find no palpable 
dorsalls pedis pulse, or posterior tibial pulses, and Mr. Avila's 
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foot was cold, Mr. Avila was quickly taken to surgery, where the 
dislocation of the right knee was reduced and the disruption of 
the popliteal artery was disclosed. Mr. Avila underwent a 
femoral popliteal bypass grafting, utilizing the autogenous 
saphenous vein from his left leg. During the surgery, a sterile 
environment was not maintained by the staff of Holy Cross 
Hospital. Further, during the post-operative period, inadequate 
wound care was given to Mr. Avila, resulting in an infection in 
the inferior aspect of the medial incision on the right knee, as 
well as in the left proximal thigh. As a result of the 
infection, the surgery to repair Avila's anterior cruciate 
ligament, sartorius tendon, medial gastroc, and semimembranosus 
repair had to be postponed. This had an adverse effect on the 
rehabilitation of Mr. Avila. Further, due to the condition of 
the incisions on both legs, Mr. Avila underwent a surgery on 
February 13, 1984, to remove necrosis of peri-incisional skin and 
subcutaneous fat on the left thigh from the donor site. 
As a result of Mr. Avila's loss of his popliteal artery and 
the subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of his right 
lower extremity. Prior to the accident, Mr. Avila was a member 
of the Bolivian Nation Ski Team and was in Park City, Utah, 
training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and other world-class 
ski races. Mr. Avila has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot 
ski again due to the risk of loss of his leg. 
By way of defense, Dr. Wynn claims that he had a 
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consultation over the phone with Dr. Howe wherein Dr. Howe 
directed Dr. Wynn to attempt to get the knee joint back into 
place. 
II. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT 
A. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL 
1. Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance Service. 
(a) Mr. Avila alleges that it was misconduct on behalf 
of the EMT's, ambulance driver or technician to remove 
Mr. Avila*s boot and splint in the ambulance. 
(b) Mr. Avila alleges that under circumstances where 
there is an acute dislocation of the knee, there is a risk of 
pinching the popliteal artery and, as a result, the leg should be 
splinted and immobilized until it can be reset by a qualified 
orthopedic surgeon. 
(c) Mr. Avila further alleges that it is misconduct on 
the part of Holy Cross Hospital to have a policy of transporting 
patients with acute orthopedic problems to the Holy Cross Clinic 
when there is not appropriate orthopedic staff on duty. 
2. Holy Cross Hospital Family Health Center. 
(a) It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Clinic 
to solicit and treat Mr. Avila, who had an acute orthopedic 
problem, with a member of the staff who was a pediatrician and 
not trained to treat severe orthopedic conditions such as 
Mr. Avila1s. 
(b) It was misconduct on the part of the Clinic 
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to solicit and treat orthopedic patients without having an 
orthopedic surgeon on call to perform that service. 
!• Holy Cross Hospital. 
(a) It was misconduct on the part of Holy Cross 
Hospital to fail to maintain a sterile environment in the 
operating room, which enabled the infection to occur in both 
incision sites. 
(b) It was misconduct on the behalf of the staff of 
Holy Cross Hospital to fail to give to Mr. Avila the appropriate 
post operative wound care, which enabled the infection to take 
place. 
(c) It was misconduct by the staff of Holy Cross 
Hospital to fail to observe, diagnose, report and treat the 
infection in Mr. Avila's extremities when they were discovered by 
the Hospital staff. 
(d) It was misconduct on behalf of the Hospital to 
maintain a clinic at a ski resort where they use their own 
ambulance service to pick up patients like Mr. Avila, with 
obvious orthopedic problems, and transport them to their own 
clinic to be treated by someone other than an orthopedic surgeon. 
(e) It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital 
not to maintain an orthopedic surgeon at the Park City Clinic if 
they were going to attempt to deal with orthopedic problems. 
(f) It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital 
not to train their staff members, such as Dr. Wynn, to refer 
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orthopedic problems either to an orthopedic surgeon in Park 
City or, alternatively, to transfer immediately orthopedic 
problems such as Mr. Avilafs to a hospital which could perform 
orthopedic services. 
B. ROBERT WYNN, M.D. 
1. It was misconduct on the part of Dr. Wynn to attempt to 
treat Mr. Avila, who had an obviously complicated orthopedic 
problem, when Dr. Wynn was a pediatrician and not trained or 
experienced in dealing with injuries such as he was faced with 
with Mr. Avila. 
2. It was misconduct for Dr. Wynn not to refer Mr. Avila 
immediately to an orthopedic surgeon or, alternatively, 
immediately transport Mr. Avila to a health care facility which 
offered orthopedic services. 
3. It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to attempt to 
put Mr. Avila1s knee back into place at all and, specifically, it 
was misconduct to attempt to put the leg back into place by 
rotating the lower portion of that extremity. 
4. It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to remove the 
splint placed on the leg. As a result of Dr. Wynn's attempt to 
rotate the lower leg and to put the same into place, the 
popliteal artery was avulsed. 
C. DAVID J. HOWE, M.D. 
Dr. Wynn alleges that he attempted to put the leg in place 
pursuant to the verbal directions given to him by Dr. Howe 
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over the telephone. If this allegation is, in fact, correct, it 
was misconduct on the part of Dr. Howe to: 
1. give verbal directions on the telephone as to how to 
get the leg in place without physically examining the same. 
2. put that treatment in the hands of a pediatrician who 
was not trained and did not have the experience to place an 
acutely dislocated knee back into place. 
3. fail to direct Dr. Wynn to refer Dr. Avila to an 
orthopedic specialist in the Park City area or, alternatively, to 
have Mr. Avila immediately transported to a health care facility 
which offered orthopedic services. 
III. AVILA'S INJURIES AND DAMAGES 
Mr. Avilafs injuries are as follows: 
1. Loss of the popliteal artery, with the increased risk 
of loss of the limb due to the vein graft. 
2. Neurological damage; i.e., numbness, in the right leg 
due *-c probable nerve damage which occurred during Dr. Wynn's 
abortive attempt at relocating the knee. 
3. The scarring which occurred on the left leg due to the 
vein grafting. 
4. The scarring and loss of tissue occurring as a result 
of the second surgery to remove the necrotic skin as subcutaneous 
fat and other tissue. 
5. The decrease in function of both extremities due to the 
vein graft and the nerve damage. 
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IV. DAMAGES 
In addition to the foregoing injuries, Mr. Avila was damaged 
due to the actions of the above-referenced health care providers 
in the following particulars: 
1. Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National Ski 
Team and was in training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, as 
well as other national and international meets, at the time of 
the accident. As a result of the vein graft, his skiing career 
is over. Had the popliteal artery not been pinched and the knee 
had been put into place appropriately, Mr. Avila would still have 
been able to ski competitively. 
2. Risk of loss of lower extremity due to the vein 
bypass. Mr. Avila has a risk that should he injure his leg 
again, he could lose his leg. 
3. The pain and suffering associated with undergoing the 
two unnecessary surgeries; i.e., the vein graft surgery which 
occurred on February 2, 1984, and the surgery to remove the 
necrotic tissue on February 14, 1984. 
4. Due to the possibility of injuring the artery in his 
leg, and the decreased function of the leg and its accompanying 
effect on Mr. Avila's lifestyle, Mr. Avila can no longer play 
active sports, such as soccer, tennis, etc. 
5. Pain and suffering associated with the infections and 
recovery from the unnecessary surgery. 
6. The costs of the extended stay in the hospital due to 
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the infection. 
7. Numbness in the legs and feet. 
8. Loss of the opportunity to ski in the 1988 Winter 
Olympic Games. Mr. Avila was assured a spot on the Bolivian 
National Team for the 1988 Olympics. By simply being a member of 
the Olympic Team, he would become a national hero. Mr. Avila had 
the talent and potential to become a world-class skier in the top 
levels of that competition. Due to his injuries, he was deprived 
of that opportunity, with the accompanying loss of the 
opportunity for lucrative endorsements, etc. 
You are hereby directed to notify your attorney and/or 
insurance carrier of this Notice of Intent to Commence 
Malpractice Action in order to notify the Department of Business 
Regulations to schedule a prelitigation medical malpractice 
hearing panel. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 1986. 
HALEY Sc STOLEBARGER 
GEORGE (Ms, H A L E t f J 1 
Attorney-^  for Rolando A\/ila 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
TENTH FLOOR WALKER CENTER 
175 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8-4IIMOS© 
• or COUNSEL 
TELEPHONE <500 531-1005 FRANK E. MOSS 
REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION PANEL REVIEW 
March 4, 1986 
3wen Rowley 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATIONS - DOPL 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
RE: Robert T. Winn, M.D.; Holy Cross Family 
Health and Emergency Center; Holy Cross 
Hospital Park City Ambulance; Holy Cross 
Hospital; David Howe, M.D. 
Dear Ms. Rowley: 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated $78-14-12, please be advised 
that this letter constitutes a formal request on behalf of my 
client, Rolando Avila, for a prelitigation panel review of 
his intended medical malpractice action against Robert T. Winn, 
M.D., Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency Center, Holy Cross 
Hospital Park City Ambulance, Holy Cross Hospital, and David 
Howe, M.D. Per your request, I enclose herewith five copies of 
this letter, together with six copies ot our Notice of Intent to 
Sue, and photocopies of our proofs of service thereof. 
I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest 
convenience; and in the meantime, should you require anything 
further in this regard, please give me a call. 
Very truly yours, 
HALEY 8c STOLEBARGER /7 
edrge MT^Haley 
:smw 
Enclosures 
cc All defendants 
A. HALEY 
- STOLEBAROER 
W APPEL 
EXHIBIT "C" 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Heber M. W e l l s B u i l d i n g 
160 East 3 0 0 South , P.O. Box 45802 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 5 3 0 - 6 7 3 0 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
-VS-
Petitioner, 
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND 
EMERGENCY CENTER, 
Respondent 
Case No- PR-86-03-007 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances: 
George M. Haley-
David W. Slagle 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of 
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and 
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is: 
<1) 
(2) 
<3) 
MERITORIOUS 
NON-MERITORIOUS 
did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 2nd day of December ,, 1986 
J* c^ 
• fc-" , . 
2*lgi;iijL. 
^xC 
•: /rf/\/'-
o 
/ I 
j fe 
<vT? 
^z_ 
9-£-<_ • 
/<'.£• 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS JULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6 730 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
-vs-
DAVID HOWE, M.D., 
Petitioner, 
Respondent 
Case No. PR-86-03-OO7 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances: 
George M. Haley-
William E. Barrett 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day* of 
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and 
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence *ras offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is: 
(1) 
<2) 
(3) 
MERITORIOUS 
NON-MERITORIOUS 
did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 2nd day of December _, 1986 
'(Udt^^^^ 
€/^.^.^ A# 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS . GULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone; (801) 530-6 730 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVI LA, 
-vs-
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D. 
Petitioner, : 
Respondent : 
Case No. PR-86-03-OO7 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances: 
George M. Haley 
David H. Epperson 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of 
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D*, and 
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters itfs Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is; 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
^ 
MERITORIOUS 
NON-MERITORIOUS 
did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 2nd day of December ., 1986 
^ H ^ A _ 
y^>/^ iti,/ / 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS x.._JULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone; (801) 530-6730 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE, 
Respondent 
Case No. PR-86-03-OO7 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances: 
George M. Haley 
David W. Slagle 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of 
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and 
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters itfs Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is: 
<1) 
(2) 
<3) 
MERITORIOUS 
NON-MERITORIOUS 
did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 2nd day of December , 1986 
t?f,Y< <17<''S'' ' - / ^ > 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS . ,GULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6730 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
-vs-
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL 
Petitioner, 
Respondent 
Case No. PR-86-03-OO7 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances: 
George M. Haley 
David W. Slagle 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of 
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and 
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
1 ^ 
MERITORIOUS 
NON-MERITORIOUS 
did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 2nd day of December , 1986 
£t± 
fC^j-cuj\ 
rfSufW/*../- ///X 
P R O O F O F S E R V I__C_J? 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing PANEL OPINIONS and 
AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE on all parties of record in this proceeding by mailing 
a copy, properly addressed, with postage prepaid to: 
George M. Haley 
Attorney at Law 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1956 
David W. Slagle 
Attorney at Law 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P,0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
William W- Barrett 
Attorney at Law 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David H. Epperson 
Attorney at Law 
HANSEN, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
176 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 8th day of December, 1986. 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 
U^V'VV 
Gwen B. Rowley 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
Commission Expiring: 2-8-90 ; 
EXHIBIT "D" 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA 
-vs-
DAVID HOWE, M.D. 
Petitioner, 
Respondent, 
Case No. PR-86-03-007 
NOTIFICATION OF 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July, 
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Bean, 
Joseph Thalman, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is: 
(1) MERITORIOUS 
(2) X NON-MERITORIOUS 
(3) "OvtfBBr-did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 6th day of July, 1988 
NON 
MERITORIOUS MERITORIOUS 
/ 
~7 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone. (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA 
-vs-
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D., 
Petitioner, 
Respondent, 
Case No. PR-86-03-OO7 
NOTIFICATION OF 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances. 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July, 
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Bean, 
Joseph Thalman, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is: 
Ki 
CD 
(2) s 
MERITORIOUS 
NOW-MERITORIOUS 
(3) Qafe»r did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 6th day of July, 1988 
t-=4= 
K a ^ T l a c k s o n / //-| 
Jdfljph Cramer 
•1 JU^~ LLJZA 
NON 
MERITORIOUS MERITORIOUS 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box A5802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA 
-vs-
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent, 
Case No. PR-86-03-007 
NOTIFICATION OF 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances: 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July, 
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Bean, 
Joseph Thalman, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
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OPINION OF THE PANEL 
The opinion that follows is applicable to all parties 
named in this proceeding. 
The Petitioner, Yolando Avila no doubt is a world class 
skiier. Unfortunately, his athletic career was terminated 
as a result of a skiing accident in the early part of 
February of 1984 in which his knee was severely dislocated* 
The dislocation is of such a rare type and severity that 
relatively few cases of this type are reported. 
The time involved between the moment the accident 
occurred, (approximately 3:00 p.m.), until he was in surgery 
at Holy Cross hospital is remarkably short. The evidence 
clearly indicates that he was on the hill until 3:40 p.m. 
and was therefore in the care of the physicians who are 
named as respondents in this case only after this point in 
time. This time period is remarkably short, which also 
leads to the fine results of the treatment rendered by all 
concerned,. 
The Petitioner in this case has a duty to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a meritorious claim 
exists. A meritorious claim exists when there is a set of 
facts presented which, if believed, would indicate that the 
health care providers deviated from the standard of care 
that was required under the circumstances. In addition, the 
Petitioner must also prove that the acts of the health care 
providers in some way aggravated his injury or prolonged the 
nature of his suffering. This the Petitioner has failed to 
do. His lawyer's efforts are clear, but the case is decided 
on the nodical facts presented and which are not materially 
disputed. 
Mr. Avila came under the care of Dr. Howe through Dr. 
Winn upon the petitioner's at arrival of the Emergency 
Center. Therefore, Dr. Winn, who holds substantial 
experience in sports accidents, rendered medical assistance 
to the Petitioner at that time, but not prior thereto. Dr. 
Howe also commenced his care at this point in time. This is 
not disputed or disputible. 
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However, the injury sustained by the Petitioner is 
directly traceable to the accident and not to any acts or 
omissions of the health care providers. Immediately upon 
dislocation of the Petitioner's knee, the arteries and blood 
veins were severely stretched and no doubt damaged, if at 
all at that time. The nerves, over the passage of time, 
would also show some damage in that they are no longer 
function. The manipulation by Dr. Winn at the request of 
Dr. Howe, was intended to reduce the risk of further damage 
to the nerve. The damage to the blood vessel, if it 
occurred at all, was already manifested or would shortly 
manifest itself. 
The case does not turn on whether or not a pulse was 
present at the time the injury was sustained. In all 
likeliness, the pulse was present for a short period of 
time, but due to the severity of the injury, the pulse, in 
all probability would have been lost, notwithstanding any 
acts by the paramedics or the physicians. In fact, the 
subsequent surgery was the ultimate and necessary medical 
course of action. The medical literature indicates that 
this type of injury can and often does result in amputation. 
In any event, the presence of the pulse (or the absence of 
it) is not the definitive medical criteria in determining 
the extent of the injuries which are going to occur as a 
result of the dislocation. 
The pulse is lost in the lower extremities of the body 
as a result of the blood clots in the veins which occur 
because of the dislocation and not by the removal of any 
boots. However, the standard of care is not to remove 
splints or boots. There is absolutely no evidence which 
indicates that the removal of the boots contributed in any 
way to the injuries that were ultimately suffered by the 
Petitioner, nor did it prolong his suffering. 
The loss of sensation in the Petitioner's extremities 
is evidence of the severe nerve damage which Dr. Winn and 
Dr. Howe were trying to mitigate when the Petitioner 
presented himself for treatment. A bad result is not in and 
of itself, evidence of negligence. On the contrary, the 
remarkable results that were achieved are evidence that the 
health care providers did in fact render extraordinary 
medical care, under the circumstances. 
The hospital's actions did not in any way contribute to 
any injury suffered by the Petitioner. The risk of 
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infection is normally associated with any surgical 
procedure. A hospital or a physician becomes responsible 
for infections only when their actions contribute to or 
enhance the risk of those normally associated with the 
procedure itself. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that this has occurred in this case. At best, the evidence 
is marginal in quality as to this issue. 
In all respects, the evidence indicates that the health 
care providers did not deviate from the standard of care 
that was required under the circumstances. Their care 
satisfied the standard of care and even more. 
The case is without merit because the Petitioner has 
failed to carry his burden of proof. 
DATED the A-CLday of July, 1988. 
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